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Written largely by and adopted at the insistence of the U.Sled Allied Occupation of Japan in the aftermath of the Second World
War, the Japanese Constitution of 1947 (“1947 Constitution”)
represents a unique contribution to U.S. geostrategic
constitutionalism. At its core, the document is an explicit extension
of the geostrategic vision espoused by Washington in 1796, a vision
to protect the nation and its vital interests from the devastation
inherent to militarism and war. U.S. legal scholars have thus far
overlooked the 1947 Constitution as part and parcel of America’s
constitutional heritage. This Note seeks to rectify this shortcoming
in the literature and preliminarily situate the 1947 Constitution in a
U.S constitutional context.
However, in seeking to so place the 1947 Constitution, the
issue of the document’s legitimacy as Japan’s “higher law”—a
recurring feature of Japanese domestic politics—comes into sharp
relief. The substantial American contribution to the development of
the 1947 Constitution has perpetuated an impression that the
document was unilaterally imposed on the Japanese nation. Yet such
a view of U.S.-imposed constitutionalism on Japan is ultimately
simplistic and superficial, and undervalues the considerable
Japanese interests represented in the 1947 Constitution itself and the
process by which it was designed. This Note builds on the significant
body of scholarship that has attacked the imposition perspective, but
rather than looking toward popular acceptance — as previous
scholarship has done — this Note considers the role of Japanese
geostrategic considerations in the 1947 Constitution’s drafting and
ratification process.
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In his 1796 Farewell Address to his young nation, George
Washington devoted significant time towards elaborating on the
geostrategic genius of America’s new constitution. “[E]very part of
our country,” exulted Washington, “thus feels an immediate and
particular interest in union.” He went on:
[A]ll the parts combined cannot fail to find in the
united mass of means and efforts greater strength,
greater resource, proportionably greater security from
external danger, a less frequent interruption of their
peace by foreign nations; and, what is of inestimable
value, they must derive from union an exemption from
those broils and wars between themselves, which so
frequently afflict neighboring countries not tied
together by the same governments.1
From Washington’s perspective, the formation of a political unum
from a fragmented pluribus offered manifold benefits for the new
North American polity: the united strength of the states would deter
unwanted militarism both by foreign national powers and the states
themselves.
Throughout the course of American constitutional
development, from the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia to
the current Obama Administration, this geostrategic vision of the U.S.
Constitution of 1789 has received regular explanation and expansion,
1 George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 19, 1796), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/
18th_century/washing.asp.
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and the concept of geostrategic constitutionalism—the influence of
national security considerations on the development of a
constitutional state—has firmly established itself within America’s
constitutional canon.2 In fact, as far as the purpose of a constitution
is to structure a polity and provide for the structure’s preservation in
perpetuity, geostrategic constitutionalism can be understood as the
foundation upon which any constitutional state is necessarily
constituted. Yet one crucial subject remains noticeably absent from
the academic literature on U.S. geostrategic constitutionalism: the
Japanese Constitution of 1947 (“1947 Constitution”).
Written largely by and adopted at the insistence of the U.Sled Allied Occupation of Japan in the aftermath of the Second World
War, the 1947 Constitution represents a unique contribution to U.S.
geostrategic constitutionalism. At its core, the document is an
explicit extension of the geostrategic vision espoused by Washington
in 1796, a vision to protect the nation and its vital interests from the
devastation inherent to militarism and war. U.S. legal scholars have
thus far overlooked the 1947 Constitution—and in particular, its
Renunciation of War Clause—as part and parcel of America’s
constitutional heritage. This Note seeks to rectify this shortcoming
in the literature and preliminarily situate the 1947 Constitution in a
U.S. constitutional context.
However, in seeking to so place the 1947 Constitution, the
issue of the document’s legitimacy as Japan’s “higher law”—a
recurring feature of Japanese domestic politics—comes into sharp
relief. The substantial American contribution to the development of
the 1947 Constitution has perpetuated an impression that the
document was unilaterally imposed on the Japanese nation.3 Among
contemporary U.S. legal scholars, Noah Feldman has been a
prominent proponent of such a view, reflecting nostalgically that
“Gone are the days when American legal officers could write the
constitution of Japan, translate it into Japanese, and extract the
acquiescence of such a Japanese government as existed under the
auspices of U.S. occupation and the reign of Supreme Allied
2 See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY (2005)
(discussing the Framers’ intent to unite the colonial landmass and establish a union).
3 It is commonly held that Japan presents the “classic,” and most successful, example
of an imposed constitution that the world saw in the twentieth century. David S. Law, The
Myth of the Imposed Constitution, in THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CONSTITUTIONS 239, 240 (Denis Galligan & Mila Versteeg eds., 2013).
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Commander General Douglas MacArthur.” 4 Across the Pacific,
numerous Japanese scholars, politicians, and members of the public
likewise espouse the viewpoint that the 1947 Constitution was a
foreign imposition on a weak post-war Japan. In particular, Japanese
conservatives frequently promote this version of historical events in
the hopes of undermining the 1947’s Constitution’s governing
legitimacy and the historically substantial public support for its
Renunciation of War Clause, which operates in law—though perhaps
not in practice—to limit Japan’s military capabilities.5
Yet this story of a U.S.-imposed constitutionalism on Japan is
ultimately simplistic and superficial, and undervalues the
considerable Japanese interests represented in the 1947 Constitution
itself and the process by which it was designed. The 1947
Constitution represented nothing short of a geostrategic victory for
the Japanese nation in the aftermath of loss in a devastating global
conflict. At the time of its creation, Japan had unconditionally
surrendered to the Allied Powers, and was both legally and militarily
at their mercy. Between the fall of 1945 and the promulgation of the
1947 Constitution on November 3, 1946, the Japanese maneuvered
within the confines of Occupation demands—sometimes choosing to
acquiesce, other times successfully exerting their own preferences—
to develop a constitution that satisfied political forces on both sides
of the Pacific. What emerged from the give-and-take was a nothing
short of a constitution for a new Japan. Therefore, while seeking to
place the 1947 Constitution in U.S. constitutional context, this Note
simultaneously seeks to place it in its Japanese constitutional context
and challenge the accusation that it was simply foisted on a weak
Japan.
As such, this Note builds on the significant body of
4

Noah Feldman, Imposed Constitutionalism, 37 CONN. L. REV. 857, 857 (2005). John
Dower has observed, “No modern nation ever has rested on a more alien constitution.” JOHN
W. DOWER, EMBRACING DEFEAT: JAPAN IN THE WAKE OF WORLD WAR II 347 (1999).
5 Law, supra note 3, at 240. The post-1947 interpretation and application of the
Renunciation of War Clause (Article 9) is beyond the scope of this Note. For more
information on Article 9 and the development of the contemporary Japanese national security
apparatus, see Karen Piotrowski, Keeping Pace with the Progress of the World: Article 9 of
the Japanese Constitution, 83 WASH. U. L. REV. 1653 (2005). In the wake of terrorist attacks
on Japanese citizens, current Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has advocated in favor of
formally amending Article 9. Martin Fackler, Abe Is Said to Have Plans to Revise Pacifist
Charter, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/06/world/asia/abewants-to-revise-pacifist-constitution-as-early-as-2016-ally-says.html.
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scholarship that has attacked the imposition perspective. While
scholars critical of the imposition interpretation of the 1947
Constitution’s history have largely written from the vantage point of
popular acceptance—arguing, for example, that the public’s support
for the new constitution endowed the document with governing
legitimacy, despite perceived opposition from Japanese political
elites6—this Note takes an alternative approach and considers the role
of Japanese geostrategic considerations in the 1947 Constitution’s
drafting and ratification process.
In other words, this Note seeks to accomplish two overarching
goals: 1) to understand the 1947 Constitution within the dual
frameworks of both U.S. and Japanese geostrategic constitutionalism;
and 2) to examine how viewing the 1947 Constitution through the
lens of Japanese geostrategic constitutionalism undermines the
assessment of the document as an imposed and foreign constitution.
The Note begins with a brief examination of both U.S. and
Japanese geostrategic constitutionalism prior to the Second World
War, and shows how the two nations’ respective constitutions and
constitutional developments embodied national security interests.
The Note then turns toward 1945, and assesses the exertion of
geostrategic considerations by both the U.S. and Japan at the
conclusion of the Second World War.
Next, the Note scrutinizes the process of drafting and ratifying
the 1947 Constitution, and argues that the document can be properly
understood through the dual frameworks of U.S. and Japanese
geostrategic constitutionalism. In the process, the Note challenges
the view of the 1947 Constitution as imposed on Japan by showing
how U.S. and Japanese actors and interests collaboratively exercised
agency and influence over the creation of the post-war constitution.
Finally, the Note concludes with a few observations on the
1947 Constitution, and the continuing influence of U.S. and Japanese
geostrategic constitutionalism in contemporary times.
6 See, e.g., Law, supra note 3, at 240 (discussing the popular support for the Japanese
Constitution and the Japanese conservatives’ strategic argument that the Constitution was
imposed). Law challenges the view of the 1947 Constitution as an imposed constitution by
challenging 1) the conflation of the preferences of the Japanese leadership of the time with
the preferences of the Japanese people and 2) the minimization of popular opinion on the
constitution-making process. In short, Law argues that public support for the 1947
Constitution shielded it at the time of its promulgation and has continued to do so throughout
the decades, providing an explanation for its considerable longevity despite calls by
conservative politicians to amend or overturn it. Id. at 241, 252-53.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

444

Vol. 11

I. PUBLIUS’ GEOSTRATEGIC VISION: THE
CONSTITUTION OF 1789 & U.S. GEOSTRATEGIC
CONSTITUTIONALISM
By 1787, the Articles of Confederation—which had formally
bound the thirteen colonies-then-states of the New World together
since their revolution against Great Britain—was failing in majestic
fashion. States showed little respect for even the limited power that
the national government could legally exercise and likewise showed
little respect for each other, threatening their individual and collective
internal stability and external security. 7 It was in this precarious
context that the 1787 Philadelphia Convention was convened.
Attended by some of the most prominent statesmen of the era—
George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, James Wilson, Alexander
Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, among others—the
Convention led to the creation and adoption in 1789 of the
Constitution of the United States.
For many of its Framers, the Constitution of 1789 concerned
the “fate of an empire in many respects the most interesting in the
world.”8 But what did this constitution actually accomplish, and why
did these illustrious men view the document’s enactment as vital to
the survival of their New World polity?
In their series of essays in support of ratification of the
Philadelphia Plan, Hamilton, Jay, and Madison—writing jointly
under the name “Publius”—argued that in order to realize the true
benefits of perpetual union, the thirteen separate states would need to
merge into one indivisible nation. Such a united polity in the New
World, argued Publius, could mirror Britain’s unique security as a
united island nation, fortified against hostile forces both at home and
abroad. As Akhil Amar has observed, “[b]y creating an ‘insular’
condition in America, the proposed Constitution would guarantee
Americans the rights of Englishmen, and more, by replicating—
indeed, surpassing—the geostrategic niche of Englishmen.”9
Publius preached the positive geostrategic implications of
perpetual union from both an internal and external perspective. In
7 See generally Jack N. Rakove, The Collapse of the Articles of Confederation, in THE
AMERICAN FOUNDING: ESSAYS ON THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 225–45 (J. Jackson
Barlow et al., eds., 1988).
8 THE FEDERALIST No. 1 (Alexander Hamilton).
9 AMAR, supra note 2, at 44.
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critiquing the internal situation faced by the several states, Publius
observed that the history of continental Europe presented a miserable
history “. . . of towns taken and retaken; of battles that decide nothing;
of retreats more beneficial than victories; of much effort and little
acquisition.” 10 In Europe, argued Publius, regimes required wellequipped and well-manned armies to defend their land borders
against invasion by their neighbors. 11 Because “most other
BORDERING nations [are] always . . . either involved in disputes
and war, or live in the constant apprehension of them,” a single state
bent on military adventurism could compel nearby states to build up
their armed capabilities as a means to deter and repel invasion,
leading in short time to the establishment “. . . in every part of this
country the same engines of despotism which have been the scourge
of the Old World.”12 Armies could be and often did find themselves
wielded not only to impede would-be invaders, but also to quash
individual liberty and collective self-government.13 To Publius, the
North American states needed to take sweeping action to avoid the
unfortunate fate of continental Europe by emulating the 1707 union
of Scotland and England: they must permanently unify their New
World landmass and be “. . . bound together in a strict and
indissoluble Union . . . superior to the control of all transatlantic force
or influence, and able to dictate the terms of the connection between
the old and the new world!”14
Examining the states’ external position, Publius argued that
the “firm league of friendship” established by the Articles of
Confederation was ill-equipped to fulfill its fundamental purpose of
securing “. . . [the states’] common defense, the security of their
liberties, and their mutual and general welfare” against “all force
offered to, or attacks made upon them, or any of them” by
10

THE FEDERALIST No. 8 (Alexander Hamilton).
Id. (“The nations of Europe are encircled with chains of fortified places, which
mutually obstruct invasion.”).
12 THE FEDERALIST No. 5 (John Jay); THE FEDERALIST No. 8, supra note 10.
13 AMAR, supra note 2, at 45. The Framers distinguished between armies and navies,
the latter being viewed as less threatening to liberty compared to the former. In fact, navies
were widely viewed as the protectors of liberty. See THE FEDERALIST No. 41 (James
Madison) (“The batteries most capable of repelling foreign enterprises on our safety, are
happily such as can never be turned by a perfidious government against our liberties.”).
14 THE FEDERALIST No. 11 (Alexander Hamilton). See also THE FEDERALIST No. 5,
supra note 12. (“If we are wise enough to preserve the Union we may for ages enjoy an
advantage similar to that of an insulated situation.”).
11
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antagonistic powers.15 To perpetuate the Articles and its weak form
of national government would be to extend an invitation to European
military adventurism in North America, and leave the young nation
unable to adequately respond. 16 From Publius’ perspective,
Americans must discourage the monarchies of Europe from seeking
to reinforce their New World presence. Compared to the loose
alliance under the Articles, a truly “United States” would be more
capable of turning back European adventurism.17 The Atlantic Ocean
would be pacific in essence; in Amar’s words, “an English Channel
times fifty, a vast moat that would protect America against . . . the
militarism of the European continental powers.”18
While Publius’ geostrategic vision primarily viewed the
Constitution of 1789 as a means to quell the dangers that would
accompany disunion, both internal and external, it also included a
practical economic component: bringing the thirteen states together
15

ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. III, para. 1; Federalist No. 15 (Hamilton)
(“[T]he concurrence of thirteen distinct sovereign wills is requisite, under the Confederation,
to the complete execution of every important measure that proceeds from the Union . . . The
measures of the Union have not been executed; the delinquencies of the States have, step by
step, matured themselves to an extreme, which has, at length, arrested all the wheels of the
national government, and brought them to an awful stand.”).
16 See THE FEDERALIST No. 4 (John Jay) (“[W]hatever may be our situation, whether
firmly united under one national government, or split into a number of confederacies, certain
it is, that foreign nations will know and view it exactly as it is; and they will act toward us
accordingly. If they see that our national government is efficient and well administered, our
trade prudently regulated, our militia properly organized and disciplined, our resources and
finances discreetly managed, our credit re-established, our people free, contented, and united,
they will be much more disposed to cultivate our friendship than provoke our resentment. If,
on the other hand, they find us either destitute of an effectual government . . . or split into
three or four independent and probably discordant republics or confederacies . . . what a poor,
pitiful figure will America make in their eyes!”). In the words of another leading Federalist,
James Wilson, “Such number of separate states, contiguous in situation, unconnected and
disunited in government, would be, at one time, the prey of foreign force, foreign influence,
and foreign intrigue.” 1 FRANK MOORE, AMERICAN ELOQUENCE: A COLLECTION OF
SPEECHES AND ADDRESSES: BY THE MOST EMINENT ORATORS OF AMERICA 78 (1st ed. 1880).
Likewise, during the Constitutional Convention, James Randolph observed that the
confederation provided no security against foreign invasion, as the congress lacked the
means to prevent or even wage war. 1 1787: DRAFTING OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 85, 87–
88 (Wilbourn E. Benton ed., 1st ed. 1986) (“If force [is necessary to meet force], this force
must be drawn from the States, and the States may or may not furnish it.”).
17 AMAR, supra note 2, at 47.
18 Id. at 46. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 8, supra note 10 (“If we are wise enough to
preserve the Union we may for ages enjoy an advantage similar to that of an insulated
situation. Europe is at a great distance from us. Her colonies in our vicinity will be likely to
continue too much disproportioned in strength to be able to give us any dangerous annoyance.
Extensive military establishments cannot, in this position, be necessary to our security.”).
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under a single “continental canopy” would save on the total amount
of money needed for military defense and other core governmental
functions, as well as more effectively distribute financial resources in
times of national exigency.19 Moreover, the creation of a united front
against European powers would simultaneously produce a
“demilitarized interstate free-trade zone,” permitting increased
business dealings between Americans themselves. 20 Free intraAmerican trade would also encourage a domestic shipping industry;
America would become a “nursery of seamen,” and these seamen
could then be converted into an American navy in times of crisis.21
While this geostrategic vision of the Constitution of 1789
informed much of its textualized structure and substance,22 a written
19 AMAR, supra note 2, at 48; THE FEDERALIST No. 13 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The
money saved from one object may be usefully applied to another, and there will be so much
the less to be drawn from the pockets of the people. If the States are united under one
government, there will be but one national civil list to support; if they are divided into several
confederacies, there will be as many different national civil lists to be provided for—and
each of them, as to the principal departments, coextensive with that which would be
necessary for a government of the whole.”); THE FEDERALIST No. 4, supra note 16 (“One
government can . . . apply the resources and power of the whole to the defense of any
particular part, and that more easily and expeditiously than State governments or separate
confederacies can possibly do, for want of concert and unity of system.”).
20 AMAR, supra note 2, at 47. In particular, the economic implications of North
American geography seemed well suited to national coordination and oversight. In a speech
to the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention, James Wilson observed, “The extent of
territory, the diversity of climate and soil, the number, and greatness, and connection of lakes
and rivers, with which the United States are intersected and almost surrounded, all indicate
an enlarged government to be fit and advantageous for them.” 2 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
BY THE STATES: PENNSYLVANIA 358 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976).
21 AMAR, supra note 2, at 48. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 41, supra note 13 (“It must,
indeed, be numbered among the greatest blessings of America, that as her Union will be the
only source of her maritime strength, so this will be a principal source of her security against
danger from abroad. In this respect our situation bears another likeness to the insular
advantage of Great Britain.”).
22 For example, compare the enumerated goals for union in ARTICLES OF
CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. III (“. . . for their common defense, the security of their
liberties, and their mutual and general welfare . . .”) with U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“. . . to form a
more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common
defence [sic], promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves
and our Posterity . . .”), with the latter adding the goal of internal security, as well as the
actions verbs “provide,” “promote,” and “secure.” Moreover, geostrategic considerations
influenced the Constitution’s ban on standing appropriations for armies (but not navies) in
Article I, section 8; its rules about state troops in Article I, section 10; its protections of the
militia in both Article I and the Second Amendment; its distrust towards “soldiers” (but not
“sailors,” mirroring Article 1, section 8) in the Third Amendment; its civilian leadership of
the military in Article II; its provisions for the admission of new states (contemplation of the
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constitution is ultimately just a few words on a piece of paper. 23
Constitution-making—or the operationalization of a constitutional
text from written word to acted deed—involves interpretation,
explanation, and action over many years by many people, with
sustained consideration for the document’s architecture and
purpose.24 This process of operationalizing the Constitution of 1789
and its geostrategic vision began under the Washington
Administration, and subsequent presidents, other political and
military leaders, and the American public itself,25 have continued the
process in earnest.26
In what was perhaps the most refined and stirring articulation
of the Constitution’s geostrategic vision since Washington’s Farewell
Address, Abraham Lincoln opined in his First Inaugural Address in
1861, “[p]hysically speaking, we cannot separate. We cannot remove
our respective sections from each other, nor build an impassable wall
between them . . . . Is it possible then to make that intercourse more
advantageous, or more satisfactory, after separation than before? Can
aliens make treaties easier than friends can make laws?” 27 Like
Publius, Lincoln worried about generating an arms race or trade war
religiously-influenced political belief that would become known popularly as “Manifest
Destiny”) in Article IV; its guarantee of each state’s boundaries against invasion and each
state’s democratic republic against military tyranny in Article IV; and its language describing
the Constitution as the law of “the Land” (again contemplating Manifest Destiny) in Article
VI. AMAR, supra note 2, at 51.
23 Akhil Reed Amar, Some New World Lessons for the Old World, 58 U. CHI. L. REV.
483, 485 (1991).
24 Id. at 485.
25 While this Note focuses on constitution-making by high-level U.S. government
actors, popular participation in America’s constitutional project serves as a foundation on
which these elites act. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Popular Constitutionalism and Political
Organization, 18 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 1, 1 (2013) (delineating the normative and
descriptive strands of popular constitutionalism, focusing on the descriptive strand and how
popular views include social movements and political parties).
26 A few early examples include the Louisiana Purchase, and the developments of the
Monroe Doctrine and the nationalist concept of Manifest Destiny. AMAR, supra note 2, at
49.
27 Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), http://avalon.law.
yale.edu/19th_century/lincoln1.asp; Abraham Lincoln, Second State of the Union (Dec. 1,
1862), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29503. The Civil War also offers a unique
intra-American case study of what Noah Feldman terms “imposed constitutionalism”: the
post-war Reconstruction, during which Union Army-occupied southern states were denied
representation in Congress until they ratified the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Feldman, supra note 4, at 859. These two amendments—the Fourteenth, in particular—
restructured the balance of power between the federal government and the states and in effect
imposed a new nationally-oriented constitutional order.
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between two neighboring national powers—in his time, the United
States and the Confederate States of America—a situation that had
the potential to lead to the permanent militarization and
impoverishment of the North American continent.28 As Lincoln saw
it, Americans who disliked the Union were themselves free to leave
it, but they could not take the land with them, or impose secession on
other Americans. Such a right would undermine—even render
moot—the valuable geostrategic dividends carefully crafted by the
Constitution of 1789.
Since Lincoln confronted a nation at war with itself,
Americans have continued to benefit from U.S. geostrategic
constitutionalism. During the Second World War, for example,
although Europe and Asia suffered colossal damage and death,
America’s wide oceanic “moats” kept the continental U.S. safe from
harm.29 However, waters alone would not guarantee American safety
in perpetuity. U.S. geostrategic constitutionalism would need to keep
pace with a changing global national security landscape, and adopt
new strategies for protecting the American people and indeed the
world.30

II.
THE WEST COMES TO JAPAN: THE MEIJI
CONSTITUTION OF 1889 AND JAPANESE GEOSTRATEGIC
CONSTITUTIONALISM
In 1853, less than a decade before Lincoln would engage in
geostrategic constitutionalism with the advent of the Civil War,
another American brought U.S. geostrategic constitutionalism across
the Pacific—to Japan. At the command of U.S. President Millard
Fillmore, Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry appeared in the
waters off the Japanese coast and demanded that Japan end the policy
of national seclusion that had characterized its approach to the outside
world for centuries.31 The following year, Perry and the Japanese
28

AMAR, supra note 2, at 52.
Id. at 52. During the Second World War, only Pearl Harbor in Hawai’i and certain
parts of Alaska came under serious attack. The continental U.S. remained unscathed and far
removed from the devastation that the war wrought throughout Europe and Asia.
30 The evolving nature of national security and warfare, and its implications for U.S.
geostrategic constitutionalism and U.S. constitutional development more generally, is
beyond the scope of this Essay.
31 LAWRENCE W. BEER & JOHN M. MAKI, FROM IMPERIAL MYTH TO DEMOCRACY:
JAPAN’S TWO CONSTITUTIONS, 1889–2002 8 (2002).
29
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leadership formally concluded the Treaty of Kanagawa, which
effectively ended the nation’s isolation from the Western world;
within a few years, a number of European nations followed suit with
similar treaties of their own.32 Taken together, these treaties gave
Western nations a slew of legal and economic rights to conduct
business in Japan, while declining to provide Japan with reciprocal
benefits in return.33
The creation of these one-sided treaties at the urging of
Western powers precipitated the collapse of Tokugawa rule over
Japan in 1868, ending its period of political domination lasting since
approximately 1603.34 Political power was returned to the Japanese
Emperor, but he struggled to maintain Japanese independence in the
face of Western pressure to open itself to foreign economic
interests.35 To discourage Western imperialism, Japan undertook a
program of rapid Westernization of its legal and political systems, a
Western power precondition to renegotiating the earlier treaties
signed in the wake of Commodore Perry’s first visit.36
However, while external pressure supplied the motivation for
domestic legal and political reorganization, Japan’s reform process
was not haphazard or without due regard for Japan’s social and
political legacy. In choosing to adopt a Western-style civil code in
the mold of the French legal system over an U.S.-style common law
regime, for example, Japanese leaders consciously considered the
appropriateness of a civil code in light of Japan’s historical familiarity
with authoritarian forms of government administration, the
Confucian tendency to respect government authority, and the
32

Id. See also The Treaty of Kanagawa: Setting the Stage for Japanese-American
Relations, NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/featured
_documents/treaty_of_kanagawa; Treaty of Kanagawa, Japan-U.S., March 31, 1845, 11 Stat.
597.
33 BEER & MAKI, supra note 31, at 8. Most prominently, the treaties provided Western
nations with a combination of port access, fishing rights, and trade privileges. “The Treaty
of Kanagawa,” supra note 32.
34 Id.; Percy R. Luney, Jr., Introduction, in JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW viii (Percy
R. Luney, Jr., and Kazuyuki Takahashi eds., 1993).
35 Id. at ix.
36 Id. During this formative period, Japan abolished feudalism and its longstanding
four-class system, including its warrior class that had ruled Japan for seven centuries; created
a centralized bureaucratic government; established a national army and navy; and created
national legal and judicial systems. Moreover, Japan underwent significant economic and
social change, including the introduction of Western science, the beginnings of a national
railway system and a merchant marine, the development of print media, and the start of
integration into global trade. BEER & MAKI, supra note 31, at 15.
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hierarchical nature of Japanese society.37 Such considerations also
actively informed and influenced the development of the Meiji
Constitution.
By the late nineteenth century, Japan was ripe for a Westernstyle written constitution. On October 12, 1881, the Emperor issued
a rescript ordering that a national legislature form by 1890. 38 While
the creation of a constitution went unmentioned, such a legislature
was without precedent in Japanese history. 39 If such a political
institution were to be established, the foundation of a constitution
would be required.40 However, a constitution was also needed for
even more compelling governance and national security reasons. The
complexity of the emerging nation-state, and the importance of order
and stability to its successful operation, would benefit from a codified
government structure.41 Most crucially for the Japanese leadership at
the time, a written constitution would signal to the Western world that
Japan was becoming a modern nation-state and deserved to be treated
on an equal footing with Western powers. 42 Japanese leadership
viewed the constitutional project as a means to assert Japanese
national power against foreign intrusion, much as Hamilton, Madison,
and Jay viewed their own constitutional project in 1780s North
America. Just as the Framers of the U.S. Constitution of 1789 utilized
a constitutionalized national governing structure as a device to
withstand foreign militarism, so too would the drafters of the Meiji
Constitution. Both sought to show the international powers of their
day that their respective nations were capable of being—indeed,
required treatment as—player of equal stature on the international
stage.
In short, both actively engaged in geostrategic
constitutionalism.

37 Luney, supra note 34, at ix. The French-inspired code was adopted in 1890.
However, in 1896, Japanese leaders replaced the French-inspired civil code with a Germaninspired code, which remains in effect to this day. See MINPŌ (民法) [CIV. C.] 1896 (Japan).
Moreover, Japan’s Criminal Code of 1907 is similarly modeled after German law. Andreas
Schloenhardt, Mission Unaccomplished: Japan’s Anti-Bôryoku-Ban Law, 28 J. JAPANESE L.
123, 128 (2010).
38 BEER & MAKI, supra note 31, at 16.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
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On February 11, 1889, Japan’s Meiji Emperor revealed
Japan’s first constitution to his country and the world.43 The Meiji
Constitution was patterned after the monarchical Prussian
Constitution of 1850, which—with its recognition of imperial
sovereignty—fit well into Japanese tradition.44 In essence, the Meiji
Constitution established an absolutist form of monarchy. This
absolutist feature of imperial sovereignty came to override some of
the Meiji Constitution’s more democratic features45 and provided a
foundation for the rise of the authoritarian militarism that would rule
over Japan from the 1930 until the end of the Second World War.46
It was then that U.S. and Japanese geostrategic constitutionalism
would collide with Japanese defeat, U.S. military occupation, and the
creation of the 1947 Constitution.

III.

GEOSTRATEGIC CONSTITUTIONALISM, ARTICLE 9,
AND CREATION OF THE 1947 CONSTITUTION

A.

The Potsdam Declaration and Allied Occupation Policy

Written and ratified during the Allied Occupation of Japan
following the Second World War, the Japanese Constitution of 1947
43

Id. at 17.
DAI NIPPON TEIKOKU KENPŌ (大日本帝国憲法) [CONSTITUTION], Nov. 29, 1890,
pmbl. (Japan) (hereinafter MEIJI CONSTITUTION) (“These Laws come to only an exposition
of grand precepts for the conduct of the government, bequeathed by the Imperial Founder of
Our House and by Our other Imperial Ancestors”); Id. at art. 1 (“The Empire of Japan shall
be reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal”); Id. at art. 4
(“The Emperor is the head of the Empire, combining in Himself the rights of sovereignty,
and exercises them, according to the provisions of the present Constitution”); Luney, supra
note 34, at ix. While the Prussian Constitution served as a model for the Japanese drafters
of the Meiji Constitution, the drafters by no means copied the Prussian Constitution in
wholesale fashion. The drafters adapted their constitution to fit Japan’s needs, at least as
they viewed them. For example, the Meiji Constitution went even farther than the Prussian
Constitution by declaring sovereignty as residing in a divine Emperor who provided the
constitution to his subjects as a generous gift. Yasuhiro Okudaira, Forty Years of the
Constitution and Its Various Influences: Japanese, American, and European, in JAPANESE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 3, 3-4 (Percy R. Luney, Jr., & Kazuyuki Takahashi eds., 1993).
45 For example, the Meiji Constitution established the Imperial Diet as the national
legislature consisting of two Houses, an upper House of Peers and a lower House of
Representatives. While the House of Peers would be composed of the members of the
Imperial Family, nobility, and other persons nominated by the Emperor, the people would
elect members of the House of Representatives. MEIJI CONSTITUTION, supra note 44, at art.
33, para. 1; Id. at art. 35, para. 1.
46 BEER & MAKI, supra note 31, at 21.
44
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represented a logical extension of American geostrategic
constitutionalism, a means to secure the freedom-promoting benefits
of peace across the aptly named Pacific Ocean. One particularly
noteworthy feature of the 1947 Constitution aimed to secure this
peace—and the liberty that flourished under it—in perpetuity. This
feature arose out of victory in war and subsequent military occupation
calling for a complete disarmament of the Japanese state. 47 This
feature was pacifism, and it was textually embodied in Article 9 of
the 1947 Constitution.
When the U.S. military occupied Japan in the fall of 1945, its
leadership came with a mandate to fundamentally transform the Meiji
Constitution, which was viewed as a cause-in-fact of Japan’s
militaristic adventurism both prior to and during the Second World
War.48 An inability of civilian government to organize itself under
the pre-war constitution without military support, coupled with a
series of assassinations organized by military groups and a perpetual
war in China, had led to the downfall and dissolution of Japanese
civilian government in the 1930s and the formation of a militarycontrolled central administration.49 From then until the end of the
Second World War, military rule and an ideology rooted in militarism
would dominate Japan.50
In addition to seeking to create a “rule of law” society
paralleling the U.S.—there was an overriding belief among U.S.
policymakers that Japan should adopt a political system based on the
American democratic ideals—the Occupation forces intended to fully
excise military influence from the Japanese body politic.51 In fact,
the former goals were widely viewed as a necessary predicate to the
latter: a democratic political society, it was believed, would serve as
a bulwark against future militarism.52
The Occupation viewed Japan as nothing short of a
militaristic state dangerous to world peace, and as such, the
47 John M. Maki, The Constitution of Japan: Pacifism, Popular Sovereignty, and
Fundamental Human Rights, in JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 40, 40 (Percy R. Luney, Jr.,
& Kazuyuki Takahashi eds., 1993).
48 CARL F. GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 41, 266
(3d ed. 2012).
49 Id. at 266.
50 Id. at 266.
51 Id. at 40.
52 Id. at 41; THEODORE MCNELLY, THE ORIGINS OF JAPAN’S DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION 132 (2000).
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eradication of Japanese militarism and complete demilitarization of
Japan formed one of the dominant aims of Occupation policy.53 From
the personal perspective of U.S. General Douglas MacArthur—head
of the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP), which was
responsible for overseeing and administering the Occupation—Japan
should become the “Switzerland of the Far East” and remain neutral
in all future wars.54
The Japanese had forewarning that Occupation policy would
emphasize pacifism. The terms of surrender articulated in the
Potsdam Declaration, accepted by the Emperor on behalf of the
Japanese nation on August 15, 1945, 55 included the destruction of
Japan’s war-making power and the complete disarmament of its
military forces.56 The Declaration also provided that “[t]he Japanese
government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and
strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people,”
which, as previously discussed, was viewed by the Americans as
adding an additional check on Japan military promiscuity. 57 The
Japanese signatories understood the Occupation conditions and in
essence consented to them.58

53 GOODMAN, supra note 48, at 266. The “United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy
for Japan,” approved by President Truman on September 6, 1945, listed “complete
disarmament and demilitarization” among the principal means to achieve the Occupation’s
objectives, together with “the establishment of a peaceful and responsible government which
will . . . support the objectives of the United States.” PETER J. HERZOG, JAPAN’S PSEUDODEMOCRACY 218 (1993).
54 HERZOG, supra note 53, at 218. The name “Supreme Commander of Allied Powers”
referred to both MacArthur’s title and the Allied Occupation offices under his supervision.
55 Japan’s formal Instrument of Surrender was signed between the Japanese government
and the Allied Powers at Tokyo Bay on September 2, 1945. The Instrument provided for
“the unconditional surrender to the Allied Powers of the Japanese Imperial General
Headquarters and of all Japanese armed forces and all armed forces under Japanese control
wherever situated.” INSTRUMENT OF SURRENDER (Japan 1945), http://www.ndl.go.jp/
constitution/e/etc/c05.html.
56 POTSDAM DECLARATION (Japan 1945), http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c06.
html. See also HERZOG, supra note 53, at 218; TETSUYA KATAOKA, THE PRICE OF A
CONSTITUTION: THE ORIGINS OF JAPAN’S POSTWAR POLITICS 17 (1991).
57 POTSDAM DECLARATION, supra note 56; MCNELLY, supra note 52, at 176.
58 INSTRUMENT OF SURRENDER, supra note 55 (“We [the Japanese signers of the
Instrument of Surrender] hereby undertake for the Emperor, the Japanese Government and
their successors to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration in good faith, and to
issue whatever orders and take whatever action may be required by the Supreme Commander
for the Allied Powers or by any other designated representative of the Allied Powers for the
purpose of giving effect to that Declaration.”); MCNELLY, supra note 52, at 28.
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With ongoing discussions concerning the fate of Japanese
military capabilities in the background, on October 4, 1945, General
MacArthur communicated to the Japanese government that the Meiji
Constitution still in force would require substantial reform. 59 The
U.S. government and the Allied Powers intended to bring about the
democratization of the Japanese governmental system, and ordered
MacArthur to see it done. 60 MacArthur repeated the requirement
directly to Prime Minister Shidehara Kijuro one week later, on
October 11, two days after the formation of his new Cabinet. With
MacArthur’s position submitted, a committee under Matsumoto Joji,
a Minister of State without Portfolio,61 was formed to consider the
question of constitutional revision.62
The Matsumoto committee put together two proposals based
on the principles of the Meiji Constitution: a relatively conservative
Draft A prepared by Matsumoto personally and a more liberal Draft
B prepared by the whole committee.63 With respect to armed forces,
Draft A stated: “The system of armed forces is retained. The supreme
command of the armed forces may not be exercised independently,
except with the advice of the Ministers of State.”64 While Draft B
deleted the Meiji Constitution’s references to armed forces, it did not
prohibit the maintenance or use of such forces in the future.65
On February 1, 1946, Draft A was leaked.66 The draft, which
continued to place sovereign power in the Emperor, was heavily
criticized by the SCAP leadership as simply too conservative, and
MacArthur decided that the “Japanese shilly-shallying [on
constitutional reform] had gone on long enough.”67 On February 3,
MacArthur ordered SCAP’s Government Section—headed by
Brigadier General Courtney Whitney and responsible for
administrative reform of Japanese governmental systems—to draw
59

James E. Auer, Article Nine: Renunciation of War, in JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 70 (Percy R. Luney, Jr., & Kazuyuki Takahashi eds., 1993).
60 MCNELLY, supra note 52, at 28.
61 A Minister of State without Portfolio refers to the position whereby the officeholder
does not have any officially delegated responsibilities, but nonetheless has Cabinet-level
status.
62 AUER, supra note 59, at 70.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 KATAOKA, supra note 56, at 37.
67 AUER, supra note 59, at 70; KATAOKA, supra note 56, at 37.
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up a new draft constitution embodying three principles: retention of
the emperor system as the symbol of the nation, but not as a sovereign
power; abolition of the nobility; and renunciation of war.68
MacArthur’s instruction concerning the renunciation of war
was broad, seemingly encompassing even self-defense:
War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished.
Japan renounces it as an instrument for settling its
disputes and even for preserving its own security. It
relies upon the higher ideals which are not stirring the
world for its defense and its protection. No Japanese
Army, Navy, or Air Force will ever be authorized and
no rights of belligerency will ever be conferred upon
any Japanese force.69
This instruction would become the basis for Article 9 and the
generally pacifist nature of the 1947 Constitution in its
entirety.
B.

The Emperor and Origins of Article 9: A Case for Japanese
Agency

As explained above, one can frequently find asserted—on
both sides of the Pacific—that General MacArthur and the U.S.-led
Occupation imposed the 1947 Constitution, with its pacifist character
as embodied by Article 9, on the Japanese nation. 70 While
MacArthur’s role in the Constitution’s formation and ultimate
68

AUER, supra note 59, at 70; KATAOKA, supra note 56, at 37; HERZOG, supra note 53,
at 219. For a comprehensive account of the American appropriation of the constitutional
project, see RAY A. MOORE & DONALD L. ROBINSON, PARTNERS FOR DEMOCRACY: CRAFTING
THE NEW JAPANESE STATE UNDER MACARTHUR 81–96 (2002).
69 Douglas MacArthur, Three Basic Points Stated by Supreme Commander to Be
“Musts” in Constitutional Revision (Feb. 4, 1946), http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/
shiryo/03/072/072tx.html#t002. Part of MacArthur’s original instructions for the anti-war
clause later appeared in adapted form in the 1947 Constitution’s Preamble. Compare
MacArthur’s instructions (“It relies upon the higher ideals which are not stirring the world
for its defense and its protection”) with the 1947 Constitution’s Preamble (“We, the Japanese
people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling
human relationship, and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting
in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world.”). NIHONKOKU KENPŌ (日
本国憲法) [CONSTITUTION], art. 9, para. 1 (Japan); HERZOG, supra note 53, at 219.
70 MCNELLY, supra note 52, at 28.
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enactment was certainly significant, it is an oversimplification to
assert that he arbitrarily imposed a foreign constitution on a feeble
post-war Japan solely for U.S. benefit. 71 MacArthur’s ultimate
position in favor of maintaining the Japanese monarchy and its
monarch was one simultaneously shared with, and highly influenced
by, the Japanese government and an overwhelming majority of the
Japanese people.72
Among the Allied Powers, prominent voices demanded the
abolition of the Japanese monarchy, including Soviet leader Joseph
Stalin and Sun Fo, president of the Legislative Yuan of the Republic
of China (ROC) and son of ROC founder Sun Yat-sen.73 Prior to
Japan’s formal surrender, the Allies had explicitly rejected an offer
from Japan that would have protected the sovereign right of the
Emperor. 74 For the Allies, Japan’s “unconditional surrender”
brought everything up for grabs, including the imperial throne. 75
Beyond the issue of the monarchy as an institution, some in the U.S.
government—high-ranking members of the War and Navy
departments, and members of Congress, among them—wanted to go
so far as to try the Emperor as a war criminal.76

71

Id.
Id. According to Feldman, “localized self-interest” is the key to creating a powerful
and durable mode of governance through the process of imposed constitutionalism.
FELDMAN, supra note 4, at 886. (“[W]here the international community or the occupier lacks
the will or capacity for sustained transformation of constitutional norms over time, it would
be mistaken to impose norms that are perceived by local political actors as antithetical to
their interests. This is especially true when the imposed norms are understood locally to
contradict important symbolic features of the constitutional order.”) Id. at 887–88.
MacArthur understood the widespread Japanese interest in maintaining the monarchy as an
“important symbolic feature” of the constitutional structure and catered to it as a means to
accomplish the goals of the Occupation, including the promulgation of a new constitution.
73 MCNELLY, supra note 52, at 28, 96. For a summary of the fall 1945 debate that took
place in Washington over the future role of the Japanese monarchy, see KATAOKA, supra
note 56, at 23 (expounding on the role of Japan’s monarchy).
74 KATAOKA, supra note 56, at 17–18; MCNELLY, supra note 52, at 2.
75 MCNELLY, supra note 52, at 2–3.
76 For example, on September 25, 1945, Democratic Senator Richard Russell of
Georgia introduced a joint resolution in Congress declaring that it was “the policy of the
United States that Emperor Hirohito [of Japan] be tried as a war criminal.” The resolution
was debated, but never passed. KYOKO INOUE, MACARTHUR’S JAPANESE CONSTITUTION: A
LINGUISTIC AND CULTURAL STUDY OF ITS MAKING 161 (1991); MOORE & ROBINSON, supra
note 68, at 36.
72
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MacArthur came to reject such extreme measures and fought
strenuously to protect the monarchy and its Emperor. 77 From a
practical standpoint, he viewed the Emperor as a valuable instrument
of governance, allowing Occupation directives to be indirectly
implemented through the Imperial Japanese Government. 78
Moreover, MacArthur himself came to respect the Emperor.79 After
all, the Emperor successfully ordered the surrender of the Japanese
military and naval forces in August 1945 and stopped the war,
renounced his divinity in January 1946, and became an official
sponsor of the democratic constitution written predominantly by
MacArthur’s staff.80 MacArthur regularly gave public praise to the
Emperor’s actions, further strengthening the post-war status of the
monarchy.81
However, while MacArthur began his mission in Japan with
an inclination towards retaining the Emperor as a means to
accomplish Occupation goals,82 his ultimate position in favor of the
Emperor came about in no small part due to a concerted lobbying
effort led by the Emperor’s own staff.83 These Japanese government
insiders were well aware of the American public’s perception of the
Emperor as a complicit actor in the Japanese war effort, and therefore
deserving of trial and punishment—a view they feared would
influence MacArthur’s policies. 84 At the same time, the Japanese
insiders were aware and took advantage of MacArthur own unofficial
Occupation goal: to advance Christianity in Japan.85
MacArthur was a pious Christian who believed that
democracy could only exist with a Christian foundation to support
77 For a summary of developments in U.S. policy towards the Japanese emperor and
MacArthur’s constitutional reforms of the Japanese monarchy, see INOUE, supra note 76, at
160-220 (describing the development of the Articles of the Constitution).
78 MCNELLY, supra note 52, at 2.
79 INOUE, supra note 76, at 219.
80 MCNELLY, supra note 52, at 11. The exact origins of the Emperor’s “Declaration of
Humanity,” issued on January 1, 1946, are unclear, though MacArthur and his staff were
involved. MOORE & ROBINSON, supra note 68, at 46.
81 KATAOKA, supra note 56, at 17.
82 In July 1945, MacArthur told his chief of staff that he favored “maximum utilization
of the existing Japanese governmental agencies and organization” as “premature dislocation
of governmental machinery would be undesirable.” Doubtless, removal of the Emperor
would have been a significant dislocation. MOORE & ROBINSON, supra note 68, at 38.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 39.
85 Id. at 38.
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it.86 In preparation for the Occupation’s democratization project, he
and his staff authorized priority entrance of foreign Christian
missionaries to Japan, ahead of any other foreign group; provided
logistical support to those missionaries groups on the ground;
supported the establishment of a new international Christian
university in Tokyo; and openly encouraged the Japanese citizenry to
embrace Christianity.87
With MacArthur’s views on the intersection of religion and
government in mind, the insiders engaged in a deliberate and
organized campaign to persuade MacArthur that the Emperor was not
only innocent of war crimes, but was himself a victim of the
militarists who had led the Japanese nation into war. They also
insisted that the Emperor was a pacifist deeply influenced by
Christianity, would cooperate with MacArthur to turn Japan into a
Christian-based democracy, and that in fact the Emperor’s
cooperation was the most efficient and effective means to accomplish
the basic American goal of Japanese democratization.88 As part of
their effort, the insiders enlisted the support and lobbying efforts of
both Japanese Christians and American missionaries.89 The insiders
knew that MacArthur’s geostrategic constitutionalism was premised
on Christianity—a belief that without the Christian faith, democracy
could not flourish.90 By recognizing and effectively working within
MacArthur’s conceptual framework of faith and constitutionalism,
the Japanese engaged in constitutionalism of their own. The Japanese
geostrategic advantage was in accommodating, at least in appearance,
MacArthur’s own geostrategic vision. To them, MacArthur’s vision
offered the surest path to maintaining their imperially oriented
national structure and regaining their full sovereignty.
In the end, the Japanese insiders won, and MacArthur was
sold. He would later advise the Japanese government on the best way
to achieve its primary objective in constitutional reform—protection
of the monarchy—and warned them about the difficulties to
achieving its objective if appropriate action was not taken. 91 As
86

Id. at 45.
Id. at 44–45. As of December 1945, SCAP guidelines spelled out that “It is the policy
of this theater to increase greatly the Christian influence and every effort will be made here
to absorb missionaries as rapidly as the church can send them into the area.” Id. at 44.
88 Id. at 38–39.
89 Id. at 39–44.
90 Id. at 44.
91 MCNELLY, supra note 52, at 28.
87

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

460

Vol. 11

General Whitney would tell the Japanese when presenting the SCAP
draft: “[T]he acceptance of the provisions of this new Constitution
would render the Emperor practically unassailable.”92
Unsurprisingly, MacArthur’s goal to preserve the institution
of the monarchy was widely accepted both within the Japanese
government and throughout Japanese society. The governing Liberal
and Progressive Parties had been elected on platforms advocating for
the preservation of the “national polity,” the central tenet of which
was the idea that the Emperor ruled by divine right. 93 During the
deliberations over the new constitution, Kanamori Tokujiro, the
cabinet minister then in charge of constitutional revision, proclaimed
to the Diet that MacArthur’s constitution would not alter the national
polity, but in fact would preserve it.94 Suzuki Kantaro, who had been
prime minister at the time of the decision to surrender to the Allied
Powers, also emphasized that the proposed constitution would
preserve the national structure, with the Emperor at its symbolic
center.95 In essence, the Japanese accepted the 1947 Constitution in
exchange for the preservation of their imperial system, engaging in
nothing short of classic geostrategic constitutionalism.96 Key to the
exchange was Article 9.
The origin of MacArthur’s idea to explicitly constitutionalize
pacifism and renunciation of war remains somewhat disputed,
although MacArthur claimed later in his career that Prime Minister
Shidehara had proposed the idea to him.97 According to MacArthur,
during a two-and-a-half hour talk on January 24, 1946, Shidehara
proposed that “when the new constitution became final . . . it [should]
include the so-called no-war clause. He also wanted it to prohibit any
military establishment for Japan—any military establishment

92

Id. at 12.
Id. at 18.
94 MCNELLY, supra note 52, at 18. Ironically, in making such public proclamations,
Kanamori in fact jeopardized the new constitution and its maintenance of the imperial system.
At meetings with Kanamori on July 17 and 23, 1946, Colonel Kades — who worked on
General Whitney’s staff — complained that statements that the new constitution would not
alter the national structure were undermining the efforts of MacArthur to preserve the
monarchy. As Kades emphasized, MacArthur had to defend the new constitution to the
Allied Powers, who were extremely critical of the monarchy, and the Japanese were making
it very difficult for MacArthur to do this. Id. at 18–19.
95 Id. at 12.
96 KATAOKA, supra note 56, at 36.
97 HERZOG, supra note 53, at 219.
93
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whatsoever.” 98
MacArthur’s account has since received
corroboration from renowned Japanese law professor Takayanagi
Kenzo, who chaired of the committee that investigated the formation
of the Constitution from 1957 to 1964. 99 Takayanagi originally
believed that MacArthur had authored and forcibly imposed Article
9 on the Japanese government. 100 Following his committee’s
investigation, however, Takayanagi concluded that:
Article 9 had its origins in Tokyo, not in
Washington. . . . Shidehara astonished the General
with a proposal for the insertion of renunciation-ofwar and disarmament clause into the new Constitution.
Apparently the General hesitated at first because of
the possible deleterious effects on United States
foreign policy in East Asia. . . . The Prime Minister,
however, succeeded in persuading the General that in
the Atomic Age the survival of mankind should
precede all national strategies.101
Despite its origins, however, “Shidehara behaved as if Article 9 were
proposed by MacArthur, although he never clearly said so. If he had
said the proposal was his idea, not MacArthur’s, it might have been
rejected by the Cabinet. Shidehara was diplomatic enough to know
this.”102
According to Shidehara’s secretary, Shidehara had indeed
suggested that Japan should renounce war in the future as a matter of
policy, but the idea to explicitly codify the policy in the 1947
Constitution came directly from MacArthur. On this account,
Shidehara was shocked to find it codified in the draft constitution.103
Other sources claim the idea originated with MacArthur.
Frank Rizzo, who succeeded General Whitney as head of the
Government Section, asserted that General MacArthur “undoubtedly
authored the war renunciation clause.”104 The personal notes of an
98

KATAOKA, supra note 56, at 36.
Auer, supra note 59, at 71.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 71–72.
103 HERZOG, supra note 53, at 219.
104 Id. at 219.
99
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officer on General Whitney’s staff likewise claim that General
MacArthur was the originator of Article 9.105 Under this view, the
most likely inspiration for MacArthur’s renunciation of war
requirement to the new constitution was the 1935 constitution of the
Philippines.106
Yet regardless of the actual origins of Article 9, the Japanese
government later explained the constitutionalization of the
renunciation of war to the Diet as an absolute requirement from
SCAP—and importantly, as an absolute requirement to preserve the
monarchy. Prime Minister Yoshida, who succeeded Shidehara in
May 1946, stated publicly that he agreed with constitutionalizing the
renunciation of war in order to quell fears of the reemergence of
Japanese militarism. 107 In other words, like their predecessors
developing the Meiji Constitution, the Japanese government used a
constitutional project to protect their national structure from the threat
of dissolution and amplify their national power in the face of
substantial foreign authority over their affairs. As MacArthur and his
American staff was developing U.S. geostrategic constitutionalism,
the Japanese cooperated as a means to assert their own. The Japanese
course of action was not coercion or imposition, but rather calculation
and choice.
These calculations would continue throughout the
deliberation and amendment process prior to the Constitution’s
promulgation, as the Japanese molded the final document into a
product reflecting their self-interest.

105

Id. at 220.
KATAOKA, supra note 56, at 37. In 1934, the U.S. Congress passed the TydingsMcDuffie Act, authorizing the Philippine legislature to convene a constitutional convention
and draft a constitution in preparation for the colony’s independence. Article II, Section 2,
of the 1935 Philippine Constitution read: “The Philippines renounces war as an instrument
of national policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part
of the law of the Nation.” Id. Other accounts contend that the idea originated from within
Government Section, as staff took inspired from the pre-war Kellogg-Briand Pact. See
MCNELLY, supra note 52, at 5–6.
107 HERZOG, supra note 53, at 220. Through 1952, Yoshida continued to insist that
Article 9 applied to offensive war potential, stating publicly that rearmament would require
a revision of the Constitution. On the other hand, Yoshida distinguished “defense potential,”
which he contended was not unconstitutional. Auer, supra note 59, at 74–75.
106
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Debate and Adoption: The Post-War Constitution’s
Promulgation

After receiving MacArthur’s orders, SCAP’s Government
Section prepared its draft constitution in six days and submitted it to
the Japanese government on February 13.108 Article 8 of the SCAP
draft—which would later become Article 9—stated: “War as a
sovereign right of the nation is abolished. The threat or use of force
is forever renounced as a means of settling disputes with other nations.
No army, navy, air force or other war potential will ever by authorized
and no rights of belligerency will ever be conferred upon the state.”109
Even with the deletion of the words “even for preserving its own
security,” the Shidehara Cabinet reacted to the clause with shock.110
However, Shidehara told his Cabinet that this new Constitution—and
the renunciation of war clause, in particular—would set the monarchy
on a more solid foundation.111 With this in mind, the clause remained.
In fact, the Emperor’s direct role in the formal
implementation of Article 9 should not be overlooked. MacArthur
viewed legal continuity with the Meiji Constitution as “necessary to
prevent subsequent invalidation of the constitution.”112 This would
require the Emperor’s cooperation and formal participation: “Article
73 of the Meiji Constitution required that in amending the
constitution, the Emperor assume ‘the initiative right’ and that the
amendment project be submitted to the Diet by ‘imperial order.’”113
Aware of his direct role in the implementation of the
provisions of the Potsdam Declaration, on June 20, 1946, the
Emperor formally initiated constitutional change by submitting the
imperial project of amendment of the Meiji Constitution to the

108 GOODMAN, supra note 48, at 40; Auer, supra note 59, at 71. For a copy of the SCAP
draft of the Constitution, see Memorandum from the Steering Comm. et al. to the Chief of
the Gov’t Section of the Pub. Admin. Div. (Feb. 12, 1946), http://www.ndl.go.jp/
constitution/e/shiryo/03/076a_e/076a_etx.html#t005 (last visited Apr. 5, 2016) (providing
the draft version that removed a provision that no amendment in the future could constrain
or eliminate the rights, which the new Constitution of Japan may guarantee).
109 Auer, supra note 59, at 71.
110 Id.
111 MCNELLY, supra note 52, at 12. See also MOORE & ROBINSON, supra note 68, at
112–14 (explaining how MacArthur convinced Shidehara that the renunciation of war clause
promoted Japan’s best interest to re-establish amicable relationships with other countries).
112 MCNELLY, supra note 52, at 15.
113 Id. at 10–11.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

464

Vol. 11

Diet.114 The imperial message referred to the elimination of obstacles
to democratic government and affirmed the vision of a constitution
representing the freely expressed will of the people.115
The SCAP draft constitution was submitted to the Diet’s
House of Representatives, which formed a 72-member Constitutional
Amendment Committee (CAC) to propose revisions.116 However, it
was understood that any changes to the draft required the concurrence
of SCAP headquarters.117 The CAC commented on the SCAP draft
and made select changes, but attempts to significantly modify the
draft were countered by American threats towards the status of the
Emperor and threats to take the draft directly to the Japanese people
for a popular election.118 The Japanese government believed that if
the SCAP draft were presented to the Japanese people alongside the
Matsumoto draft, the SCAP draft would be overwhelmingly
approved, and so the government understood that its role was to
acquiesce to the new Constitution and its reconceptualization of the
Japanese state.119
The CAC eventually proposed two amendments concerning
Article 9: the words “aspiring sincerely to an international peace
based on justice and order” were added to the beginning of the first
sentence; and the words “in order to accomplish the aim of the
preceding paragraph” were added to the beginning of the second
sentence.120 When the amendments were brought to the attention of
Government Section, no objections were made.121
At the time, the public explanation for the additions was that
they would more sincerely indicate Japan’s wish for peace—however,
just a few years later, Ashida Hitoshi, who had chaired the CAC,
114

Id. at 16.
Id. at 15.
116 Id. at 16–17; Auer, supra note 59, at 73.
117 MCNELLY, supra note 52, at 16.
118 GOODMAN, supra note 48, at 40.
119 Id.
120 Auer, supra note 59, at 73.
121 MCNELLY, supra note 52, at 21. In fact, according to historian Sato Tatsuo, the
Government Section showed a great deal of respect for Japanese preferences, refrained from
applying pressure during the Diet deliberations, and approved almost all changes
recommended by the Japanese. The ideas that the Government Section proposed were not
foreign to Japan; since the late nineteenth century, educated Japanese had been well informed
of trends in Western constitutional thought, but progressive constitutional ideas were unable
to get traction in the face of the ultra-nationalism that gripped Japan until 1945. BEER &
MAKI, supra note 31, at 85.
115
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announced that the amendments to Article 9 had been written
specifically to permit rearmament for the purpose of self-defense.122
Ashida’s claim directly conflicted with the objectives of the
Occupation, which included Japan’s perpetual demilitarization as a
primary goal. From the Occupation’s perspective, a complete
prohibition of armed forces would seem the most effective means of
preventing the reappearance of militarism. 123
Nonetheless,
MacArthur’s staff seemed to have been aware of the interpretive
changes introduced by the CAC amendments and nonetheless
acquiesced. When Dr. Cyrus Peake, a Government Section officer,
pointed out to General Whitney that the CAC’s textual modifications
would permit Japan to maintain defense forces, Whitney agreed that
this change was “acceptable.”124
Throughout the Diet deliberations, Prime Minister Yoshida
repeatedly clarified the enactment of the new democratic constitution
would fulfill a basic precondition for the withdrawal of the
Occupation forces: the establishment of a democratic form of
government, as provided in paragraph 12 of the Potsdam
Declaration. 125 Interestingly, Yoshida’s argument for adopting
SCAP’s draft constitution mirrored the arguments motivating
Japanese leadership of the 1880s to create the Meiji Constitution. In
both the late 1880s and late 1940s, Japan found itself under the thumb
of foreign power, and in each instance Japanese leaders viewed
constitutionalism as an avenue of escape and renewed vitality. In
neither period was constitutionalism imposed on Japan; rather, both
cases demonstrate Japan choosing constitutionalism as a means to
achieve geostrategic advantage. The constitutionalism of 1940s
Japan began with surrender to the Allied Powers and acceptance of
the Occupation on Japanese soil, and was managed with a view
towards reassuming the position of a sovereign and self-governing
nation. In short, like their American occupiers, the Japanese actively
engaged in geostrategic constitutionalism.
122

Auer, supra note 59, at 73.
HERZOG, supra note 53, at 220.
124 MCNELLY, supra note 52, at 21. In fact, despite early policies suggesting permanent
disarmament, the American government directive known as SWNCC 228 stated that the
civilian branch of government should control the military, suggesting that the American
government did not expect a perpetually demilitarized Japan. Nowhere did SWNCC 288
suggest the imposition on a permanent ban on war. HERZOG, supra note 53, at 218–219;
KATAOKA, supra note 56, at 35.
125 MCNELLY, supra note 52, at 16.
123
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The new constitution—drafted by the Occupation, with select
approved modifications made by the CAC—was promulgated by the
Emperor on November 3, 1946, in line with the procedure for
constitutional amendment set out by the Meiji Constitution.126
The 1947 Constitution’s Preamble sets a pacifist tone that
glosses the entire document. From its opening sentence, the
denouncement of militarism and aggression that motivated the
constitution’s drafters becomes evident, as “We, the Japanese people”
declare themselves “determined that we shall secure for ourselves and
our posterity the fruits of peaceful cooperation with all nations and
the blessings of liberty throughout this land, and resolved that never
again shall we be visited with the horrors of war through the action
of government.” 127 To forever prevent the “horrors of war” and
secure “the fruits of peaceful cooperation”—to effectuate the
Preamble’s ambition and promise, both for the U.S. and Japanese
nations who had fought the bitter war in the ironically named
Pacific—the 1947 Constitution codifies its renunciation of war in the
words of the constitutional text itself:
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on
justice and order, the Japanese people forever
renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the
threat or use of force as means of settling international
disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the
preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well
as other war potential, will never be maintained. The
right of belligerency of the state will not be
recognized.128
This was the promise of the 1947 Constitution, a promise directed
towards the Americans and Japanese alike. 129 Indeed, it was a
promise directed towards the world.

126 GOODMAN, supra note 48, at 40. Coincidentally, November 3 also happened to be
the 94th anniversary of the birth of the Meiji Emperor. Id.
127 NIHONKOKU KENPŌ (日本国憲法) [CONSTITUTION], May 3, 1947, pmbl. (Japan).
128 Id. at art. 9.
129 Whether the promise has been fulfilled is another matter entirely, but is beyond the
scope of this Note.
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CONCLUSION

Leading Japanese politicians today continue to challenge the
legitimacy of the 1947 Constitution, arguing that its structure and
substance are designed to keep Japan perpetually weak. 130 Some
conservative Japanese scholars have even gone so far as to refer to
Japan’s acceptance of SCAP’s draft constitution as the nation’s
“second surrender.”131
Superficially, this line of reasoning has some truth to it.
Article 9 was indeed considered a crucial element to the goals of the
victorious Americans, who did not want the specter of a future war in
the Pacific hanging over their heads.132 MacArthur’s revision of the
Japanese constitution, therefore, can be understood as an effort to
enforce the principal objective of U.S. Occupation policy: to prevent
Japan from ever again endangering U.S. national security.133 In fact,
MacArthur himself came to view the Japanese Occupation as his
greatest military achievement. 134 This was U.S. geostrategic
constitutionalism at its apex.
Yet to contend that the 1947 Constitution was manifestly an
imposed instrument of government undersells at best, and overlooks
entirely at worst, the agency of Japanese actors and the consideration
given Japanese interests in the constitution’s development,
ratification, and ultimate promulgation.135 The constitutional debates
130 MCNELLY, supra note 52, at 148-150. These members of Japan’s political class
overlook the fact that the constitution which the 1947 Constitution replaced—the Meiji
Constitution—was itself largely of foreign origin and imposition, albeit less directly. Law,
supra note 3, at 264.
131 KOSEKI SHŌICHI, THE BIRTH OF JAPAN’S POSTWAR CONSTITUTION 109 (Ray A.
Moore trans., 1997).
132 GOODMAN, supra note 48, at 41–42. Ironically, the Occupation’s support for
Japanese disarmament and the prohibition of the Japanese to ever again become a military
power did not last long. The outbreak of war in the face of communist expansion on the
Korean peninsula in 1950 changed their tune. American policymakers soon came to view
Article 9 as a strategic error, one that kept Japan disarmed in the face of communist
aggression. In fact, speaking in Tokyo in November 1953, then-Vice President Richard
Nixon himself “pointed out that the situation in Asia had become radically different from
what it had been when Article 9 was enacted at the insistence of the U.S. leaders.” Id. at
268; MCNELLY, supra note 52, at 150–151.
133 MCNELLY, supra note 52, at 133.
134 KATAOKA, supra note 56, at 29–30.
135 At the same time, such a view undersells the Occupation’s collaborative approach
to constitutional development. See also MOORE & ROBINSON, supra note 68, at 10
(explaining that the U.S. Occupation found constitutional revision as “absolutely
fundamental” in reforming Japan and even aspired to use its own national tradition of
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within the Japanese political community in 1946 were not hasty or
shallow, or subservient to Occupation pressures.136 To contend that
the 1947 Constitution—or, even more narrowly, Article 9—was
imposed on a helpless Japan ignores the intelligent and well-informed
Japanese who seized the moment to lay a new foundation for their
nation in the post-war world.137 The Japanese weighed their interests
and made a series of calculated decisions to protect them. In
particular, Japanese leadership exercised its own brand of
geostrategic constitutionalism. These leaders chose surrender and
cooperation with the Allied Powers in order to protect their monarchy
and their national sovereignty in the long run. Like the Meiji
Constitution of the late nineteenth century, constitutionalism came to
be viewed by the Japanese as a means to reach a geostrategic end: the
national vitality of the Japanese state.
More tellingly, despite mechanisms available in the 1947
Constitution to formally amend the document—or even excise
Article 9 in its entirety—Japan has never undertaken to do so. Quite
to the contrary, the 1947 Constitution has never been formally
amended. 138 “[F]ew if any, alien documents have ever been as
thoroughly internalized and vigorously defended as this [Japanese]
national charter would come to be [by the Japanese public].” 139
Moreover, this vigorous defense of the constitution as ratified did not
take long to foment: shortly after the proposed constitution became
public in 1946, public opinion polls revealed strong and immediate
support for the constitution’s foundational precepts, including eightyfive percent of respondents favoring retention of the Emperor in a
reduced role, and seventy-two percent characterizing Article 9 as
necessary.140
However, since the 1947 Constitution’s enactment, Japanese
governments have regularly “reinterpreted” its provisions to suit
changing national security needs. As recently as July 1, 2014, Japan’s
current Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, “reinterpreted” Article 9 to
permit Japan’s Self-Defense Force (SDF), the country’s pseudoconstitution-making as a “normative” guide to help “establish forms of government,” which
could bring “happiness” for other nations).
136 BEER & MAKI, supra note 31, at 92.
137 Id.
138 MCNELLY, supra note 52, at 29.
139 DOWER, supra note 4, at 347 (alteration to original).
140 Law, supra note 3, at 254. Mainichi Shimbun, one of Japan’s major newspapers,
conducted the cited poll.
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military, to play a more assertive role in East Asian affairs.141 Rather
than being confined to a merely defensive role, the reinterpretation
would allow the SDF to aid “friendly countries under attack” under a
theory of collective self-defense.142 Even a decade ago, such use of
force by the SDF would have been unthinkable.143
While the reinterpretations of Article 9 in which Abe and his
predecessors have engaged might be seen as adventurous when
compared to the clause’s text and intent, they have a check: the vote.
Japan’s present foreign policy is as much determined by the public’s
attitude towards its own interpretations of Article 9 as by diplomacy
and national security strategy.144 While the Japanese government’s
stance has been to arm its country purely for individual self-defense,
the Japanese people as a whole strongly support the aspiration for
peace expressed in the 1947 Constitution and embodied in Article
9.145 Geostrategic constitutionalism lives on.

141 Martin Fackler & David E. Sanger, Japan Announces a Military Shift to Thwart
China, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/02/world/asia/japanmoves-to-permit-greater-use-of-its-military.html?_r=0.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 MCNELLY, supra note 52, at 151.
145 Id.
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